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ABSTRACT: We extend the knowledge about the causal attribution mechanism
by investigating the roles of causal ascription (stability and locus of causality)
and causal interpretation (personal control and responsibility) after error
occurrence. One hundred twenty-five participants were randomly assigned to one
of four experimental conditions (internal vs. external by unstable vs. stable
attribution instructions). Internal unstable ascriptions lead to higher perceived
control after error occurrence. Both control and responsibility, in turn, predict
task behavior. While causal interpretation predicts outcome measures, causal
ascriptions are related to the same measures only indirectly. Implications for
research and practice are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
‘‘Errors are always forgivable if one has the power to acknowledge
them.’’ (De La Rochefoucauld, 1815, p. 86). With this aphorism, the
French author may have pointed out the impact of the construal of
meaning after causes have been assigned to errors. People identify such
causes, as it is functional to obtain knowledge about events, for example
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for the purpose of undertaking subsequent action (Kelley, 1971). As-
signed causes can lead to considerable differences in behavior (Weiner,
1985, 1986). It has been shown that causes like lack of effort are more
desirable than others (e.g., lack of ability), as they lead to constructive
(e.g., determination) rather than destructive (e.g., learned helplessness)
behavior (Anderson, 1983; Dweck, 1975; Fo¨rsterling, 1985; Medway &
Venino, 1982; Weiner, 1986).
In error management training, behavior after error occurrence is
influenced by the presentation of positive error heuristics like ‘‘I have
made an error. Great!’’ (Heimbeck, Frese, Sonnentag, & Keith, 2003).
These positive error heuristics are presented to facilitate emotional
coping after error occurrence, thereby aiding people to consider that er-
rors can also be interpreted as informative feedback (Heimbeck et al.,
2003). It has been shown that error management training leads to more
functional task behavior such as more requests for assistance, less
frustration and better performance than does error avoidant training
(Chillarege, Nordstrom, & Williams, 2003; Nordstrom, Wendland, &
Williams, 1998).
People thus engage in functional behavior when they interpret
error occurrence as a situation from which positive aspects can appear.
Although restraining negative emotional reactions after error occur-
rence leads to functional, performance oriented interpretations of error,
it is not clear how the process of interpretation after error occurrence
leads to functional task behavior. Our goal is therefore to establish the
influence of causal attribution on behavior after error occurrence,
based on three literatures of success and failure attribution (theory of
motivation and emotion, Weiner, 1985; self-efficacy theory, Bandura,
1982; theory of learned helplessness, Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale,
1978). We propose, furthermore, a new way of studying the causal
attribution mechanism. We decided not to use explicit causes such as
lack of effort for the manipulation of the causal attribution dimensions
as recent research has shown that explicit causes do not lead to
equivalent outcomes on the causal attribution dimensions (Van Dyck &
Homsma, 2005). We will first found our proposition that causal
assignment after error occurrence influences subsequent behavior.
Next, we will describe in detail the new way of studying the causal
attribution mechanism.
Attribution after Error Occurrence
Behavior after error occurrence is related to performance.
Edmondson (1996) found that teams that were more open about errors,
had a more constructive error handling approach and better performance
than groups that were less open about errors. Functional behavior after
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error occurrence is optimized by means of early error detection, quick
and effective correction and error analysis (Van Dyck, 2000). Although
behavior after error occurrence is associated with performance, little is
known about the origin of those behaviors. Weiners (1985, 1986) attri-
butional model of motivation and emotion has identified causal attribu-
tions as important predictors of behavior. The causes that people
perceive (e.g., after making errors) can be classified among three com-
mon dimensions: locus of causality, stability, and controllability, with
intentionality and globality as possible other dimensions (Weiner, 1985).
Heider (1958) proposed the most fundamental dimension: locus of con-
trol. Causes can be attributed to factors within the person (internal locus)
or to factors that lie within the environment (external locus). Weiner
et al. (1971) later redefined this causal dimension into locus of causality,
thereby differentiating the dimension locus (of control) from perceived
control. They further reasoned that some causes are perceived as con-
stant whilst other causes are perceived as unstable, and proposed a
second dimension of causality: stability. A cause, apart from being
internal or external, is defined as stable when it remains constant, and as
unstable when it is likely to fluctuate. Rosenbaum (1972) proposed the
dimension controllability by recognizing that causes like effort, mood and
fatigue all are considered to be internal, unstable causes, but differ in the
extent to which control can be exerted over them. That is, mood and
fatigue are causes that are to a lesser degree under control than effort
expenditure. Although it is beyond dispute that controllability plays an
important role in giving meaning to situations, there has been some
debate about the incorporation of this third dimension control in the 2
(locus of causality) 2 (Stability) classification (e.g., Hewstone & Antaki,
1988).
A major complication of the attributional model is that the three
dimensions, although conceptually distinct, are also highly interrelated
(e.g., Anderson, 1983). As a result, some combinations of the 2 (Locus of
causality) 2 (Stability) 2 (Control) classification that Weiner (1985)
proposed, seem contradictory. As Weiner (1986, pp. 49–50) noted,
‘‘external-controllable and stable-controllable causes are difficult to
imagine.’’ For example, if a striker in a soccer match assigns a missed
scoring opportunity to the poor condition of the soccer pitch (assignment
to an external locus), there is little room for the striker to gain control
over the situation. In the same vein, stable-controllable attributions are
difficult to imagine. When for example, the striker attributes a missed
goal scoring opportunity to a lack of ability (assignment to stable cause),
there is again little room for the striker to gain a certain amount of
control over the situation. In the remainder of the introduction it is
discussed how we have dealt with this contradiction, by proposing a new
way to study the causal attribution mechanism.
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Causal Ascriptions and Behavior
As causal attributions have big impact on subsequent behavior,
several theories have described the influence of causal attributions.
Research has shown that internal unstable ascriptions after failure
generally lead to more functional behavior than the other types
of ascriptions (Abramson et al., 1978; Bandura, 1982; Weiner, 1985).
Weiner (1985) proposed that unstable causal ascriptions after failure
lead to constructive behavior as the expectancy to perform those tasks
successfully remains unaffected. That is, if the cause of an outcome is
seen as unstable, the cause that led to the negative outcome is not nec-
essarily expected to occur again and, therefore, the expectancy to per-
form well on that task would remain unaffected. If, on the other hand, a
cause of an outcome is considered as stable, the cause is expected to
reoccur when working on the same task, and thereby lowers the expec-
tancy to perform well on that task.
Following Bandura (1977), desirable causes for failure are low effort
or bad luck because those explicit causes should lead to desirable attri-
butions (internal and external unstable respectively), which maintain
the belief in ones capabilities to organize and execute the sources of
action required to manage prospective situations.
In Seligmans theory of learned helplessness (Abramson et al., 1978;
Maier & Seligman, 1976) it is suggested that situations can be perceived
as generally controllable or uncontrollable, which lead to feelings of
determination or feelings of learned helplessness. Attributing outcomes
to controllable causes such as effort, an internal unstable attribution,
would then lead to an active task approach. Attributing outcomes to
uncontrollable situations such as lack of ability, in contrast, would lead
to the undesirable causes of learned helplessness (Dweck, 1975).
It has thus been argued that the dimensions of causal attribution,
locus of causality, stability and controllability predict desirable and
undesirable behavior after failure. Internal unstable and internal con-
trollable causal ascriptions after failure should lead to functional task
behaviors such as persistence, an active approach towards achievement
tasks and unimpaired performance. On the other hand, stable, stable
internal, and uncontrollable causal attributions after failure lead to less
functional task behavior such as lower persistence and effort expendi-
ture. The key question, however, is whether the influence of attributional
style on behavior after failure situations is similar to the influence of
attributional style on behavior when people make errors.
To our knowledge, only one study has explored attributional style in
relation to error handling behavior. Van Dyck (2005) found that internal,
controllable attributions after error occurrence led to better performance.
When participants acknowledged responsibility for an error and made
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control oriented suggestions for improvement in future tasks, control,
learning and performance were enhanced. This finding is in line with the
attribution literature as well as with research on attributional retraining
(for an overview, see Fo¨rsterling, 1985). If people attribute failure to
their own lack of effort (an internal and unstable cause), this is likely to
lead to an active task oriented approach (Dweck, 1975). It has been
shown that such desirable causes also lead to functional task behaviors
such as high persistence and accuracy (e.g., Chapin & Dyck, 1976;
Fowler & Peterson, 1981; Schunk, 1981). Concerning the relation
between causal ascription and behavior after error occurrence, we expect
that:
Hypothesis 1: Internal unstable causal ascription of error leads to
more functional task behavior than the other types of causal ascription.
In the current study we use an alternative approach to study the
relations between causal ascription and functional task behavior. In the
majority of studies investigating the influence of the dimensions of causal
attribution on behavior, explicit causes such as lack of effort have been
used for the manipulation of locus of causality and stability (e.g., internal
and unstable; Weiner, 1985). We decided not to use explicit causes for the
manipulation of locus of causality and stability as recent research has
shown that explicit causes do not lead to equivalent outcomes on the
dimensions of causal attribution (Van Dyck & Homsma, 2005). Van Dyck
and Homsma showed that people may ascribe and even agree upon ex-
plicit causes, but do not have to take action that is in line with this
explicit cause. People might agree upon explicit causes for events such as
lack of effort when performing a certain task, but do not necessarily have
to make an internal and unstable ascription for that explicit cause. Van
Dyck and Homsma studied participants who were presented with tasks
for which too little time was offered. Time pressure was indeed recog-
nized by almost all participants (93%) as the primary cause. This explicit
cause, however, yielded striking differences on the causal attribution
dimensions. With the cause time pressure in mind, some ascribed the
locus internally whilst others made external ascriptions. There may,
thus, be a difference between the assignment of an explicit cause and the
ascription to causal attribution dimensions. Explicit causes may there-
fore be less appropriate for the manipulation of causal attribution
dimensions.
Although it has been shown quite convincingly that explicit causes
like lack of effort are more desirable than other explicit causes (Weiner,
1980, 1985), it is not clear whether the causal attribution mechanism is
sufficiently explained by the causal dimensions of locus of causality and
stability. A second disadvantage of using explicit causes for the manip-
ulation of explicit causes namely is that they also automatically involve a
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certain amount of causal interpretation. An explicit cause such as lack of
effort, for example, is meant to bring forth an internal and unstable
ascription. This internal and unstable ascription would then lead to
subsequent functional task behavior. Another plausible possibility is that
instead of an internal and unstable ascription, this explicit cause can
bring forth an interpretation of being capable to pursue that same task
successfully in the future; the perception of personal control. By using
explicit causes for the manipulation of ascription, it is thus not clear
whether causal ascriptions (e.g., internal and unstable) or interpreta-
tional processes (e.g., perceived control) affect behavior. For example, if
the explicit cause lack of effort is presented, it is not obvious whether
functional task behavior is caused by an internal and unstable ascription
or by the perception of personal control.
Explicit causes such as lack of effort may thus yield unforeseen
interpretation processes that cannot be controlled by the researcher. A
manipulation of locus of causality and stability without using explicit
causes creates the possibility to study the effects of locus of causality and
stability on behavior without unforeseen influences of interpretational
processes such as the perception of control. To our knowledge, this is one
of the first studies that investigates causal ascription (locus of causality
and stability) separately from unforeseen influence of the highly inter-
related yet distinct causal dimension of control.
By manipulating causal ascriptions (e.g., internal and unstable)
without affecting causal interpretation following from those assigned
causes (e.g., perceived control) the separate effects of causal ascription
after error occurrence on functional task behavior can be tested. We
propose that causal ascriptions influence functional task behavior
through the causal interpretation process. We will also report findings on
the partition of the attribution mechanism into a causal ascription and a
causal interpretation component. In the following section the concepts of
causal ascription and causal interpretation will be further developed.
Causal Ascriptions and the Process of Interpretation
We consider causal ascription as a core causal characteristic which
by itself does not convey meaning. After core causal characteristics of the
error have been identified (e.g., internal and unstable), meaning can be
construed by the process of interpretation, which, we propose, in turn
influences subsequent behavior.
We argue that the interpretational process after error occurrence
consists of interpretations related to personal control and responsibility.
As discussed earlier, control has a strong influence on behavior, but there
has been quite some debate about the incorporation of this dimension
into the locus of causality and stability classification. We argue that in
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contrast to the causal dimensions stability and locus of causality, the
amount of control implies interpretation of the situation whilst locus of
causality and stability in essence are core causal characteristics, which
in itself do not convey meaning.
The importance to study the separate effects of causal ascription
(locus of causality and stability) and the interpretational process is fur-
ther accentuated by research concerning perceived control. Research has
shown that perceived control over negative outcomes has a large impact
on behavior. Anderson and Arnoult (1985) demonstrated the superiority
of control after failure over the other causal dimensions in predicting
depression, loneliness and shyness. One of the first studies investigating
the impact of control on negative outcomes were rat experiments of
Mowrer and Viek (1948). Rats that were unable to control electrical
shocks developed dysfunctional eating behaviors, whilst control rats
eating behavior was not greatly affected. Hiroto and Seligman (1975)
similarly demonstrated that people who perceive an inability to control
outcomes perform poorer than people who perceive the ability to control
outcomes. Similarly, Van Dyck (2005) found that making suggestions for
improvement after error occurrence which were under control of the
participant led to enhanced learning and performance. Thus, we propose
that the degree of perceived control after error occurrence influences
functional behavior.
We further propose that the interpretational process after error
occurrence comprises, in addition to control, the degree of responsibility
people perceive. In describing six areas of research; locus of control,
personal causation, intrinsic-extrinsic motivation, perceived freedom,
reactance and learned helplessness, Weiner (1980, p. 269) argued that
these research areas ‘‘were all associated with the allocation of respon-
sibility along an internal (self) vs. external (environmental) dimension.’’
Responsibility can be denied by assigning outcomes to external causes,
but can alternatively be acknowledged by attribution to either stable, or
unstable internal causes (Tesser, 1988). Acknowledging responsibility is
presumed to produce desirable behaviors such as openness to informa-
tion and expectancy of success. Denying responsibility, in contrast, leads
to undesirable behavior such as avoidance of information, lowered
expectancy of success and lack of realism (Weiner, 1980).
We argue, therefore, that the core causal ascription can be classified
by stability and locus of causality. From classified error causes, meaning
can then be construed by the process of interpretation. This process of
interpretation comprises perceived personal control and responsibility.
People do not automatically perceive control or acknowledge
responsibility after errors. Before errors can be interpreted, the cause of
the error has to be identified. Proposing that personal control and
responsibility stem from the causal ascription of error (Hypotheses 2 and
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3), we further predict that the interpretational process mediates the
relationship between the ascription of causes and functional task
behavior.
Hypothesis 2: Internal unstable causal ascription of error leads to
more personal control than the other types of causal ascription.
Hypothesis 3: Internal causal ascription of error leads to more
responsibility than the other types of causal ascription.
Hypothesis 4: Personal control and responsibility mediate the rela-
tionship between the ascription of causes and functional task behavior.
METHOD
Participants and Experimental Design
One hundred twenty-five students participated in the experiment.1
The sample was composed of 84 (67%) women and 41 men. Mean age
was 20.77 (SD = 3.16). In return for their participation, they received
seven Euros. Locus of causality (internal vs. external) and stability
(stable vs. unstable) were manipulated in a 2 2 between subjects
design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four exper-
imental conditions.
Task
Participants were informed that during the experiment, tactical in-
sight was investigated by playing three trials of a video game. A demo of
Lemmings developed by Kay (1991) was used for these three trials.
Lemmings is a video game where the objective is to lead a group of
lemmings from an entry point to an exit point. In order to advance to the
next level, one has to save a certain percentage of lemmings. The video
game is built up around different functions that can be used to develop
strategies to lead the lemmings to an exit point. If, however, your
strategy is wrong, the lemmings wander aimlessly into dangerous situ-
ations. When a level is successfully accomplished, an access code for
entry to the next level is presented. Each level has its unique access code,
consisting of 10 characters.
1Data from 15 individuals were excluded from further analyses. Thirteen participants
successfully finished Trial 3, defying our error inducement of the task. Analyses revealed
that the participants who accomplished the level within six minutes had far more experi-
ence in playing the game Lemmings (M = 4.50) than the participants who had not
accomplished Trial 3 (M = 1.90; t (137) 6.85, p < .001. One participant was unable to com-
plete the experiment as the computer she was working on broke down and one participant
erroneously claimed having finished Trial 3.
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Functions
The game can be played by using eight functions: climbing, floating,
exploding, blocking, building, bashing, mining, and digging.
Procedure
Participants were seated in separate cubicles and were asked to
follow the instructions provided on the computer screen. Participants
were informed that during the experiment their tactical insight was
investigated during three trials of the video game Lemmings. The first
screen on the computer welcomed the participants after which they were
asked to complete a questionnaire. The questionnaire measured possible
covariates. After filling in the questionnaire, participants played three
trials of the video game. At the start of each trial participants received a
manual and the manipulations were enforced.
The first manual informed participants about the objective of the
game, game controls and information presented by the game. The pur-
pose of Trial 1 was to familiarize the participants with the game. Trial 1
was completed when participants successfully played one level of the
game while working through the manual of Trial 1. After participants
finished Trial 1, the experimenter checked whether they had worked
through the manual correctly. No time limit was set for Trial 1, so that
participants could take their time to get familiar with the game.
During Trial 2, the participants were focused on the errors they
made during the game and we let them take notice of the games per-
formance element. Before the start of Trial 2, the experimenter handed
over the second manual and told the participants they could play for
10 minutes. Ten minutes was ample time for the participants to be
confronted with errors and to accomplish several levels. Each time they
made an error, participants were asked to pause the game and to write
down a short error description in the manual. On average the partici-
pants wrote down 2.15 errors (SD = 1.17). The participants could check
the time they had left, as an alarm was set.
Trial 3 introduced a level that contained an error inducement. At
first sight, the level seemed attainable with a fairly easy strategy.
However, there was only one efficient strategy to accomplish Trial 3. The
participants were instructed to play the presented level for a maximum
of 6 minutes. The experimenter gave the impression that it was possible
to finish the more difficult third level by instructing the participants to
call for the experimenter when they had accomplished Trial 3. As in Trial
2, the participants could check the time they had left. The experimenter
stopped the participants from working on the task when the alarm
sounded. After being stopped from working on Trial 3, participants were
asked to describe the strategies they had used during Trial 3, and were
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asked to fill out measures concerning causal attribution and their
expectancy towards accomplishing Trial 3 if they would have another
possibility to play Trial 3. After filling out the questions, the participants
were debriefed, thanked and paid. The total duration of the experiment
was 45–60 minutes.
Manipulations
The use of causal ascriptions (StabilityLocus of causality) was
manipulated by instructing participants think about stable/unstable and
internal/external causes when attributing their errors. As we were
interested in the process of error cause interpretation, we made a dis-
tinction between the assignment of causal ascriptions and the sub-
sequent process of interpretation. That is, we manipulated the causal
ascriptions of Stability (stable vs. unstable)Locus of causality (internal
vs. external) and measured subsequent interpretations (see Measures
section). In the next paragraph, the manipulations are illustrated by the
internal stable condition. The other manipulations are specified within
parentheses.
Before each trial we presented the text: ‘‘It is likely that you will
make errors during this trial. Errors can be explained by a lot of different
causes. During this trial, the purpose is to think of causes that are rel-
atively stable [unstable] and related to you [the situation]. This means
that the error is likely to [does not necessarily] occur again, and that the
cause of error should be attributed internally [externally]’’. Thus, while
explicit instructions were given to think about certain ascriptions, no
actual examples of these ascriptions were offered.
In the manuals of Trial 1 and 2 the following text was presented:
‘‘Before starting this trial, we have asked you to think about possible
causes for the errors you would make. Try to think of causes that are
relatively stable [unstable] and relate to you [the situation]. What kind of
causes of this type can you give for the errors you have listed?’’ In total,
participants were reminded of the manipulation five times: before each of
the three trials; and in the manuals of Trial 1 and 2.
Measures
Control Variables
To control for possible effects on the dependent variables, partici-
pants were asked to complete a demographic questionnaire concerning
gender, age and education. Furthermore, a combination of two items was
used to measure game proficiency. The two items were ‘attitude towards
video games which was measured on a scale ranging from 1 (I really
dislike playing video games) to 5 (I really like playing video games), and
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‘amount of experience in playing the game Lemmings which was
measured on a scale ranging from 1 (I have no experience at all in playing
Lemmings) to 6 (I have a lot of experience in playing Lemmings; k = 2,
Cronbach alpha = .56).
Error Attribution
To measure the dimensions (a) locus of causality; (b) stability and; (c)
personal control, we used the corresponding items of the Causal
Dimension Scale II (CDSII; McAuley, Duncan, & Russell, 1992). The
proposed attribution dimension (d) responsibility was measured with a
self-developed 3-item scale similar to those of the CDSII.
All items were measured on a 5-point scale. In this experiment we
changed the root of each item ‘‘Is the cause something’’ as used in the
CDSII (McAuley et al., 1992) to ‘‘Is the cause of the error something’’
(e.g., Is the cause of the error something you can regulate?).
The dimensions locus of causality (k = 3, Cronbach alpha = .71) and
stability (k = 3, Cronbach alpha = .61) were used as a manipulation
check. Personal control (k = 3, Cronbach alpha = .69) and responsibility
(k = 3; Cronbach alpha = .79) are mediators in our theoretical model. The
responsibility scale consists of the items: ‘‘Is the cause of the error
something: (1) you hold yourself responsible for—you hold yourself not
responsible for; (2) you are liable for—you are not liable for; and (3) that
is accountable to you—not accountable to you.’’
Functional Task Behavior
Task behavior in Trial 3 was measured by (a) the perceived amount
of expectancy of success after Trial 3; (b) the amount of exploratory
behavior throughout Trial 3; (c) the efficiency of the proposed strategy
after Trial 3; and (d) the quality of the proposed strategy after Trial 3.
Expectancy of Success
After Trial 3, participants were asked to estimate the total number
of attempts they would need to accomplish Trial 3. The item was mea-
sured on a scale with 1 (I need one more attempt to accomplish Trial 3)
and 9 (I need nine or more attempts to accomplish Trial 3) as anchor
points. We reverse-scored the expectancy of success measure so that
higher scores would indicate a higher expectancy of success.
Exploratory Behavior
Participants were asked to describe the strategies they had used
while working on Trial 3. To arrive at a measure for exploratory
behavior, each strategy was rated for functions. Exploratory behavior
could thus range from 0 (no functions have been used) to 8 (all eight
functions have been used). Two coders, blind to the experimental
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conditions, the first author and a graduate student, rated the strategies
for the eight different functions (climbing, floating, exploding, blocking,
building, bashing, mining, and digging). The graduate student
was familiar with the game and the level played in Trial 3. The overall
inter-rater agreement for the eight functions was sufficient (Cohens
kappa = .78).
Strategy
After Trial 3, participants were asked to describe the strategy they
would use if they had one more try. For Trial 3, the successful and most
efficient strategy consisted of a combination of five functions (climbing,
floating, blocking, digging and exploding). Each strategy was coded for
these five functions. Strategy could thus range from 0 (no correct func-
tions suggested) to 5 (five correct functions suggested) as anchor points.
The overall inter-rater agreement was sufficient (Cohens kappa = .79).
Quality of Strategy
The strategies that participants said they would use if they had one
more try were all tested for quality (the percentage of saved lemmings).
In the first step, the two coders independently of each other developed a
classification for all described strategies. A comparison of the two clas-
sifications revealed that the two coders agreed on 10 strategies. Besides
the 10 strategies they agreed on, one coder had identified two extra
strategies. The two coders discussed these two strategies and agreed to
put the two strategies into the strategy classification.2 In the second step,
all 12 strategies were tested. Seven strategies led to a saving percentage
of 0. Two strategies led to a saving percentage of 33.4, one strategy led to
a saving percentage of 90, one strategy led to a saving percentage of 95
and one strategy led to a saving percentage of 98.5. The percentage of
saved Lemmings associated with the strategy was used as our measure of
quality of strategy.
RESULTS
Manipulation Check
The manipulations of the causal dimensions locus of causality and
stability were successful. Participants that had been instructed to
attribute errors to internal causes scored significantly higher (M = 3.18,
2The two strategies the coders initially disagreed on were low quality strategies which
one coder had placed under the strategy: no strategy. The two strategies were tested and did
not lead to saved lemmings. The two taxonomies developed by the coders, thus do not lead to
different results.
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SD = 1.00) on an internal locus of causality than participants that had
been instructed to manipulate errors to external causes (M = 2.71,
SD = .93; F (1, 121) = 6.07, p = .02). Participants that had been in-
structed to attribute errors to stable causes scored significantly higher
(M = 2.68, SD = .85) on stability than participants that had been
instructed to manipulate errors to unstable causes (M = 2.30, SD = 1.00;
F (1, 121) = 4.47, p = .04).
Control Variables
The majority (67%) of our participants were female. Univariate
Analyses of Variance (ANOVA) with gender included as a factor revealed
that gender greatly affected personal control, responsibility and func-
tional task behavior. Correlational analyses further showed that game
proficiency was significantly correlated with expectancy of success
(r = .30, p < .01), exploratory behavior (r = .33, p < .01), strategy (r = .24,
p < .01), and quality of strategy (r = .33, p < .01). Gender was included as
a factor in all analyses. Gender differences are reported whenever they
reach conventional levels of significance. The control variable game
proficiency was used as a covariate in all analyses. Partial correlations
Table 1
Means, Standard Deviations, Kappa’s, and Partial Correlations between Causal
Ascription (Manipulation Check), Causal Interpretation and Task Behavior
with Gender and Game proficiency partialled out
Variables Scale Kappa/a M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Manipulation Checks
1. Stability 1–5 .61 2.47 .92 –
2. Locus of
causality
1–5 .71 2.92 .98 .14 –
Mediators
3. Personal
control
1–5 .69 3.53 .95 ).15 .42**–
4.Responsibility 1–5 .79 3.06 1.04 .13 .69** .63**–
Functional Task Behavior
5. Expectancy
of success
1–9 n.a. 6.09 2.50 ).21* .06 .23* .23* –
6. Exploratory
behavior
0–8 .76 1.75 1.39 ).14 .14 .16 .12 .09 –
7. Strategy 0–5 .75 .85 1.14 ).16 .12 .19* .20* .35** .35**–
8. Quality
of strategy
0–100 .79 17.23 30.54 ).10 .15 .21* .24** .21* .39** .62**–
Note. N = 125; n.a. = not applicable; *p < .05; **p < .01, all tests are two-tailed.
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among the studied variables are displayed in Table 1. The results do not
differ substantially when the covariate Game proficiency is left out of the
analyses.
Hypotheses Testing
Effects of Causal Ascriptions on Functional Task Behavior
A 2 2 (Locus of causalityStability) multivariate analysis of var-
iance (MANOVA) on expectancy of success, exploratory behavior, strat-
egy and quality of strategy was performed to test Hypothesis 1 that
internal unstable ascriptions lead to more functional task behavior than
the other types of causal ascription styles.
The MANOVA revealed a significant univariate two-way interaction
effect of StabilityLocus of causality on quality of strategy (F (1,
122) = 5.19; p < .05, g2 = .04). The nature of the two-way interaction is
depicted in Figure 1. As predicted, internal unstable ascriptions led to a
higher percentage of saved Lemmings than internal stable and external
unstable ascriptions. Internal unstable ascriptions, however, did not lead
to a higher percentage of saved Lemmings than external stable ascrip-
tions.
Although there was a trend (see Table 2), internal unstable ascrip-
tions did not lead to more exploratory behavior than the other types of
causal ascriptions (F (1, 122) = 1.95, ns). There was an unpredicted sig-
nificant univariate main effect of locus of causality on exploratory
behavior, (F (1, 122) = 6.07, p < .05, g2 = .05). Participants that were
instructed to attribute errors to internal causes showed more exploratory
behavior (M = 2.03, SD = 1.41) than participants instructed to attribute
errors to external causes (M = 1.42, SD = 1.35). The predictions that
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Quality of Strategy as a Function of Locus of Causality and Stability (+1 en )1
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internal unstable ascriptions lead to higher expectancy of success and
better strategies than the other causal ascription styles were not sup-
ported. There were no interaction effects of StabilityLocus of causality
on expectancy of success, F (1, 122) = .02, ns, and strategy (F (1,
122) = .63, ns). Means and standard deviations are presented in Table 2.
Effects of Causal Ascriptions on the Causal Interpretation Process
In Hypothesis 2 we predicted that internal unstable ascriptions
would lead to more personal control than would other types of causal
ascriptions. An ANOVA on personal control revealed a two-way inter-
action of locus of causality and stability (F (1, 122) = 4.74, p = .03,
g2 = .04)3. The nature of the two-way interaction is depicted in Figure 2.
Table 2
Observed Means and Standard Deviations for Manipulation Check Variables,
Causal Interpretation and Task Behavior with Gender included as a between
persons-factor and Game proficiency included as a covariate
Experimental condition
Internal External
Unstable Stable Unstable Stable
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Sample n = 31 n = 29 n = 29 n = 36
Manipulation check
Stability 2.37a (1.05) 2.91b (.84) 2.22a (.94) 2.45ab (.82)
Locus of causality 3.22a (1.01) 3.13ab (1.00) 2.62b (.84) 2.80ab (1.00)
Mediators
Personal control 3.83 (.85) 3.32 (1.02) 3.34 (1.12) 3.63 (.83)
Responsibility 3.36a (1.17) 3.13ab (1.10) 2.77b (.99) 3.09ab (.92)
Task behavior
Expectancy of success 6.00 (2.47) 5.89 (2.56) 6.46 (2.67) 6.21 (2.39)
Exploration 2.26a (1.41) 1.82ab (1.42) 1.29b (1.21) 1.54b (1.45)
Strategy 1.13 (1.37) .73 (.92) .78 (.86) .72 (1.29)
Quality of strategy 26.45 (35.03) 12.51 (25.39) 8.49 (19.71) 20.20 (36.03)
Note. N = 125, means in the same row that do not share a superscript differ at p < .05
3This effect was qualified by a significant GenderLocus of causalityStability
interaction, F (1, 121) = 5.91, p < .02. Simple effects analyses revealed no overall differences
in personal control between men and women, F (1, 123) = .01, ns) When we examined each
sex differently, we found that the Locus of causalityStability interaction was highly
significant for men, F (1, 37) = 7.22, p = .01, but not for women, F (1, 81) = .04, ns. Simple
effects analyses revealed that men perceived more personal control when they ascribed
errors to internal unstable and external stable causes than when they ascribed errors to
internal stable and external unstable causes, F (1, 37) = 7.22, p = .01.
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As predicted, internal unstable ascriptions led to more personal control
than internal stable and external unstable ascriptions. Internal unstable
ascriptions, however, did not lead to more personal control than external
stable ascriptions. Hypothesis 2 was partially supported.
We further predicted that internal ascriptions would lead to more
responsibility than external ascriptions (Hypothesis 3). ANOVA did not
reveal a main effect of locus of causality on responsibility (F (1,
122) = 2.44, ns). Hypothesis 3 was thus not supported.4
Mediation Effects
We predicted that both personal control and responsibility mediate
the relationship between causal ascriptions and functional task behavior
(Hypothesis 4). As Hypotheses 2 and 3 were respectively partially and
not supported, no mediation effects of personal control and responsibility
on the relationship between causal ascription and functional task
behavior could be tested. Hypothesis 4 was not supported.
Theoretical Distinction between the Causal Ascription and Causal
Interpretation Component
To assess whether our theoretical distinction between causal
ascription and causal interpretation is supported by our data, we first
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Personal Control as a Function of Locus of Causality and Stability (+1 en )1
Standard Deviations from the Mean)
4There was a GenderLocus of causalityStability interaction, F (1, 121) = 8.05,
p < .01. Simple effects analyses revealed no overall differences in responsibility between
men and women, F (1, 123) = .28, ns. When we examined each sex differently, we found that
the Locus of causalityStability interaction was again highly significant for men, F (1,
37) = 6.66, p = .02, but not for women, F (1, 81) = 1.40, ns. Simple effects analyses revealed
that men perceived more responsibility when they ascribed errors to internal unstable than
when they ascribed errors to the other types of causes; F (1, 37) = 6.44, p = .02.
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investigated the inter-correlations of the attribution variables. The par-
tial correlation of the causal ascription variables stability with locus of
causality (manipulation check) showed no significant relation. Stability
did not have significant correlations with the causal interpretation
variables. Locus of causality however, correlated positively with both
personal control (pr = .42, p < .01) and responsibility (pr = .69, p < .01).
The correlation of the causal interpretation variables personal control
with responsibility was .63 (p < .01). On the basis of the high relations
between the causal interpretation process (personal control and respon-
sibility) and locus of causality measures, the theoretical distinction be-
tween causal ascription and causal interpretation could be questioned.
To investigate our argument that locus of causality is indeed distinct
from personal control and responsibility, we conducted confirmatory
factor analyses. Confirmatory factor analyses were performed using
LISREL 8.7 (Jo¨reskog & So¨rbom, 1993) on the items of the causal
ascription and causal interpretation variables. Analyses of models that
collapsed these factors together indicated that our proposed four-factor
model provided a better fit to the data (see Table 3).
We tested our proposed four-factor model (stability, locus of causal-
ity, personal control, and responsibility) with logical combinations of the
items into three-factor models and one two-factor model and found that
the tested models fit the data less well than our proposed four-factor
model proposed. First, a three-factor model of stability, responsibility
and locus of causality and personal control combined fitted the data less
well than the four-factor model proposed (v2diff 28,53; p < .01). Second, a
three-factor model of stability, locus of causality and personal control and
responsibility combined also fitted the data less well than our proposed
Table 3
Model Fit for the Four-Factor Model and Four Alternative Models
Modela v2 df RMSEA RMR GFI CFI v2diff
a
Proposed four-factor model: stability,
locus of causality, personal control &
responsibility
62.17 48 .05 .11 .92 .98
Three-factor model: responsibility
and locus of causality combined
75.58 51 .06 .11 .92 .97 13,41*
Three-factor model: personal control
and responsibility combined
89.69 51 .08 .12 .89 .95 27,52*
Three-factor model: locus of causality
and personal control combined
90.70 51 .09 .13 .88 .95 28,53*
Two-factor model: locus of causality,
personal control and responsibility
combined
98.40 53 .09 .13 .87 .95 36,23*
Note. N = 125; *p < .01; presents the difference in v2 as compared to the proposed model.
G. J. HOMSMA, C. VAN DYCK, D. DE GILDER, P. L. KOOPMAN, AND T. ELFRING 575
Table 4
Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Personal Control and Responsibility on
Task Behavior
Predictor/step b R2 FR2 DR
2 FDR2
Step 1 Effects on Expectancy of Success
Game proficiency .27** .11 1.7 .11 1.70
Gender ).06
Locus of causality ).08
Stability .04
GenderLocus of Causality .04
GenderStability .00
Locus of causalityStability ).01
GenderLocusStability .05
Step 2 Personal Control .13 .17 2.28* .06 4.22*
Responsibility .16
Step 1 Effects on Exploratory Behavior
Game Proficiency .37** .19 3.41** .19 3.41**
Gender .06
Locus of causality .23*
Stability .03
GenderLocus of Causality .02
GenderStability .00
Locus of causalityStability .13
GenderLocusStability .17#
Step 2 Personal Control .12 .20 2.85** .01 .70
Responsibility ).01
Step 1 Effects on Strategy
Game proficiency .26* .09 1.49 .09 .49
Gender .01
Locus of causality .08
Stability .10
GenderLocus of Causality .07
GenderStability ).02
Locus of causalityStability .08
GenderLocusStability .08
Step 2 Personal Control .07 .13 1.73# .04 2.50#
Responsibility .15
Step 1 Effects on Quality of Strategy
Game Proficiency .31** .17 2.86** .17 2.86**
Gender ).01
Locus of causality .08
Stability .02
GenderLocus of Causality .05
GenderStability ).04
Locus of causalityStability .21*
GenderLocusStability .15
Step 2 Personal Control .04 .20 2.91** .03 2.77#
Responsibility .18
Note. N = 125, #p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, all tests are two-tailed.
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four-factor model (v2diff 27,52; p < .01). Third, a three-factor model of sta-
bility, personal control and locus of causality and responsibility combined
also fitted the data less well than the four-factor model proposed (v2diff
13,43; p < .01). We also tested a two-factor model with stability as a
separate factor and locus of causality, personal control and responsibility
as a combined factor. Finally, we tested the two-factor model and found it
to fit the data less well than the four-factor model proposed (v2diff 36,23;
p < .01).
To further explore this issue, we conducted standardized hierarchi-
cal regression analyses (see Table 4). This was done so that we could test
whether causal interpretation variables had effects on functional task
behavior above and beyond causal ascriptions. After controlling for the
full-factorial model of the variables gender, locus of causality and sta-
bility and the covariate game proficiency (Step 1), we put the variables
personal control and responsibility into the second step of the analyses.
We found that the second step of the analyses containing the causal
interpretation variables personal control and responsibility still ex-
plained extra variance on expectancy of success, strategy and quality of
strategy. As reported in Table 4, the causal interpretation process
explains an additional six percent of the variance in the dependent
variable expectancy of success (FDR2 = 4.22, p < .05), whereas step 1 did
not reveal a significant effect (FDR2 = .82, ns). Higher personal control and
responsibility lead to a higher expectancy of success. The causal inter-
pretation process explains furthermore an additional four percent of
variance in strategy and quality of strategy (FDR2 = 2.50, p < .10 and
FDR2 = 2.77, p < .10), respectively.
To summarize, although causal ascriptions and causal interpreta-
tions are highly correlated, they affect task behavior differently. Based
on confirmatory factor analyses, we can conclude that the four factors
represent empirically distinct constructs. Standardized hierarchical
regression analyses further showed that the causal interpretation pro-
cess is a valuable predictor of expectancy of success, strategy and quality
of strategy above and beyond the causal ascription process. Standardized
regression analyses on quality of strategy revealed the earlier described
interaction effect of stability and locus of causality. Internal unstable and
external stable ascriptions lead to higher quality strategies than internal
stable and external unstable ascriptions. Personal control and respon-
sibility did not affect exploratory behavior.
DISCUSSION
The goal of our study was two-fold. As every organization has to deal
with errors, it is essential to generate more knowledge about the ante-
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cedents of behavior after error occurrence. The causal attribution
mechanism has been identified as an important antecedent of behavior.
Our main objective was, therefore, to establish the influence of attribu-
tion after error occurrence on subsequent task behavior. As recent
research has shown that the same explicit cause can lead to a variety of
causal ascriptions (Van Dyck & Homsma, 2005), we decided not to use
explicit causes for the manipulation of causal ascription.
By manipulating causal ascription, rather than using explicit causes
we were able to extend the understanding of the causal attribution
mechanism. The manipulation of causal ascription without explicit cau-
ses made it possible to study the effects of causal ascription (locus of
causality and stability) without interference of the causal interpretation
process (personal control and responsibility). Unlike studies using
explicit causes for the manipulation of causal ascription, we were thus
able to describe the pure relation between causal ascription, causal
interpretation and functional task behavior.
In line with research on failure attribution (Abramson et al., 1978;
Bandura, 1982; Weiner, 1985), our results revealed a trend that partic-
ipants instructed to think about internal and unstable causes after error
occurrence, carried out more exploratory behavior than those instructed
to use other causal ascriptions. Internal unstable ascriptions after error
occurrence also led to higher quality strategies than did internal stable
and external unstable ascriptions. Looking at quality of strategy, how-
ever, participants instructed to assign errors to external stable causes
did equally well as participants instructed to assign errors to internal
unstable causes. This result could be explained by what Seligman and
Schulman (1986) have described as the optimistic explanatory style for
bad events. They found that in situations where people repeatedly
encounter failure, rejection and indifference, external failure attribu-
tions predict survival and productivity. Since video games as Lemmings
are developed to entertain people through challenging levels, the game
could be perceived as a situation in which errors regularly occur. Con-
trary to our expectation, internal unstable ascriptions did not lead to
better strategies and expectancy of success than the other ascriptions.
The fact that the superiority of internal unstable ascriptions over the
other ascriptions was only partially supported, could be explained by the
separation of the error attribution mechanism into a causal ascription
and a causal interpretation component. The manipulation of causal
ascriptions free of confound with the causal interpretation process did
reveal different relations with functional task behavior when compared
with research using explicit causes for ascriptions. Significant relations
of personal control and responsibility with expectancy of success, strat-
egy and quality of strategy offer room for the suggestion that not causal
ascriptions but causal interpretations predict behavior. These results
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suggest that instead of causal ascriptions, the causal interpretation
process might have a stronger influence on behavior after setbacks.
The current study started with the notion that the influence of
causal ascriptions on functional task behavior runs through the process
of causal interpretation. Due to the fact that we found that internal
unstable and external stable ascriptions lead to higher quality strategies
than external unstable and internal stable ascriptions, we were unable to
confirm the hypothesis of the causal interpretation process as a mediator.
With regard to our test of effects of causal interpretation after causal
ascriptions have been accounted for, the causal interpretation process
seems to be a valuable predictor of expectancy of success, strategy and
quality of strategy. We found significant relations between causal
interpretation and functional task behavior. Personal control and
responsibility both related positively with expectancy of success, strategy
and quality of strategy. In contrast to the causal interpretation process,
causal ascriptions were not significantly correlated with expectancy of
success and strategy. This is an interesting finding, as it emphasizes the
importance of separating the error attribution mechanism into a causal
ascription and a causal interpretation component.
Although substantial correlations were found between the factors
locus of causality, personal control and responsibility, analyses of models
that collapsed these factors together indicated that our proposed four-
factor model provided a better fit to the data. The high correlation
between responsibility and personal control is a point of concern as it
questions the necessity to include both variables in the interpretational
process. Although the correlation between responsibility and personal
control is indeed a point of concern, we think that it is too early to draw
conclusions. The setting in which errors take place, for example, might
influence the relation between personal control and responsibility.
Although personal control and responsibility will always be related to
each other it is likely that acknowledgement of personal control and
responsibility will differ under other circumstances. The current exper-
imental setting, for example, was individualistic in nature as there were
no other individuals present who could take responsibility for the errors.
Responsibility might play a different role in organizational settings.
Supervisors for example are likely to perceive differences in acknowl-
edged responsibility when their subordinates do not meet deadlines.
Independent of high or low personal control, the supervisor can
acknowledge a lot of responsibility (e.g., ‘‘I should have been on the spot
instead of attending the board-meeting’’). On the other hand, the
supervisor can acknowledge little responsibility (e.g., ‘‘whenever I have
other obligations, they work careless’’).
In summary, results of our study suggest that internal unstable
ascriptions and external stable ascriptions are superior to internal stable
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and external unstable ascriptions. That is, with regard to personal con-
trol and quality of strategy. This outcome contradicts the dominant
stream of research, which states that internal unstable ascriptions are
superior to the other types of ascriptions. The manipulation of causal
ascriptions free of confound of causal interpretation might be account-
able for this finding. Future research should reveal whether causal
interpretation processes affect subsequent behavior above and beyond
causal ascriptions. Our results suggest that indeed causal ascription and
interpretation have distinct relationships with functional task behavior.
We think that future research that looks into the precise working of the
attributional mechanism by manipulating causal ascriptions without
influencing causal interpretation can have great potential to lead to a
more profound understanding of the relationship between error attri-
bution and subsequent behavior.
Strengths and Limitations
The strength of the experiment lies in the separation of the error
attribution mechanism into a causal ascription and a causal interpreta-
tion component. To our knowledge, this is the first time that causal
ascriptions have been experimentally manipulated in a pure sense,
without confound of the causal interpretation process.
Although it turned out that the manipulation check was successful,
the effect of the stability manipulation was quite small. We cannot be
sure whether this can be ascribed to the manipulation itself or to diffi-
culties in manipulating certain causal ascriptions. The setting of the
experiment may have caused the small effect of the stability manipula-
tion. It is possible that the video game used for the experiment was not
suitable for making external ascriptions as video games in essence can be
mastered by practice. Although we acknowledge this possibility, we have
reason to believe that the experiment was set up in such a way that it
provided sufficient opportunities to attribute errors to external causes.
First, the manipulation check measure showed a symmetric distribution
on our locus of causality measure. Second, investigation of the partici-
pants written error causes revealed six categories that could be depicted
as external causes. The participants attributed errors to the four common
external causes (1) time pressure; (2) task difficulty; (3) bad luck; (4)
noisy conditions. The participants furthermore blamed (5) the lemmings;
and (6) the instructions.
When experiments are built up around a task, one should control for
gender specificity. In our experiment, we did find gender differences for
personal control and responsibility. Gender specificity, however, can
influence any type of study investigating causal attribution. Causal
attribution studies have regularly reported the influence of gender on
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causal attribution (e.g., Mitchell, 1987; Ryckman & Peckham, 1986;
Valas, 2001). The gender differences in this study, revealed a consistent
pattern. When we examined men and women separately, we found no
differences for women in the different types of ascriptions. Men perceived
more personal control and responsibility when they ascribed errors to
internal unstable and external stable ascriptions than when they as-
cribed errors to internal stable and external unstable causes. As tasks in
fact always run the risk of being gender specific, future research on the
attributional mechanism should consistently incorporate gender as a
factor in the analyses.
Practical Implications
As making errors is human, organizations have to deal with the
errors made by their employees. The aim of organizations is often to
prevent errors from occurring in the first place (Argyris, 1992). However,
an organizational strategy exclusively aimed at error prevention has its
limitations, as it is impossible to eliminate error occurrence (Reason,
1997). It has been documented that constructive error handling is posi-
tively related to performance (Edmondson, 1996; Van Dyck, Frese, Baer,
& Sonnentag, 2005). Furthermore, error-handling patterns after error
occurrence are shared by employees within organizations (Van Dyck,
2000). Although we know that behavior after error occurrence is asso-
ciated with performance and task behavior (Van Dyck, 2005), so far, little
is known on how those behaviors originate. Our study has tried to pro-
vide more insight in the error attribution mechanism after error occur-
rence.
We believe that the separation of the error attribution mechanism
after error occurrence into a causal ascription and a causal interpretation
component is an interesting framework which has considerable potential
to lead to a more thorough understanding of behavior after error occur-
rence. From a practical perspective, the separation of the error attribu-
tion mechanism into a causal ascription and a causal interpretation
component might offer interesting implications for organizations to
encourage their employees to ascribe and interpret error causes con-
structively.
As error handling is related to performance, managers should invest
effort in the promotion of functional task behavior after error occurrence.
One tool for managers to take hold of the subordinates behavior after
error occurrence is their interpretation process after error occurrence.
Managers should focus on creating an atmosphere in which employees
consistently take responsibility and find ways to perceive control after
error occurrence. As the creation of shared understanding is a difficult
and time-consuming activity, managers should try to set an example for
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the subordinates. By consistently taking responsibility for errors and
finding ways to perceive control over errors, subordinates should even-
tually develop a shared functional understanding on how to interpret
errors and to constructively deal with them.
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